Weaponizing Ambiguity: China’s Militarization of Low Earth Orbit and the Breakdown of Space Deterrence

China’s current militarization of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) reflects more than a pursuit of technological equivalence with the United States. Rather, it illustrates a calculated strategy to exploit ambiguity in space governance through dual-use satellite programs and unregulated rendezvous proximity operations (RPOs). By incorporating military capabilities within civilian platforms and utilizing its belief in civil-military fusion, China has developed space infrastructure that deliberately undermines the traditional mechanisms of deterrence. This paper investigates China’s approach through the perspective of deterrence theory and hybrid conflict, using case studies such as the Shijian-6 (SJ-6) constellation and the expansive StarNet project. The argument proposed is that China’s space strategy prioritizes coercive flexibility over stability, exploiting regulatory oversights and legal ambiguity in order to challenge international norms. Drawing on multiple sources, this paper critiques the limitations of current global governance frameworks and proposes policy measures aimed at rebuilding transparency and establishing clarity in governance of space operations.

Introduction

The accelerated growth of China’s presence in LEO has often been seen as a natural response to U.S. technological dominance in space. However, this framing oversimplifies the underlying strategic logic. Rather than merely seeking equality, China seems motivated to reshape the rules of orbital activity by exploiting legal ambiguities. This shift reflects broader trends in hybrid warfare, a deliberate policy of mixing civilian and military functions, which was only made possible by Beijing’s civil-military fusion doctrine.

Under this framework, space assets serve dual purposes: while marketed for civilian use—like environmental monitoring or telecommunications—they are tied to primarily military objectives. As a result, traditional distinctions between commercial and military satellites have become practically meaningless, therefore complicating efforts to assess China’s motivations. This ambiguity is essential to China’s approach, allowing them to maneuver in LEO without causing direct confrontations with other political actors or breaching any formal treaties. The argument proposed in this paper rests on three core claims: (1) China’s dual-use satellite systems represent a coercive strategy grounded mainly in ambiguity; (2) the absence of regulatory frameworks governing RPOs has allowed for an arms race in precision orbital maneuver satellites; (3) international responses remain inadequate and out of sync with new realities in space.

Civil-Military Fusion and Strategic Ambiguity

Imperative to China’s LEO position is its civil-military fusion (军民融合) policy, which depicts more than a cross-sector governance integration. It is a choice that allows Beijing to develop space capabilities with civilian cover while also retaining military utility. An illustrative example is the Shijian-6 (SJ-6) satellite pairs, which are officially launched for “space environment monitoring.” In practice, however, they have conducted many close-in RPOs, often within 1 kilometre—indicating capabilities more aligned with surveillance, interference, or even offensive operations.

The broader family of dual-use constellations, including the Yaogan, Jilin-1, and GaoFen platforms, operates similarly at a cross-section of the civil-military domain. While officially associated with peaceful applications such as disaster response or agricultural mapping, their technical capabilities—including high revisit rates, real-time imaging, and AI-enhanced data processing—allow persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). These systems are firmly integrated within the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) command and control systems. For example, Jilin-1’s ability to obtain maritime imagery every 10 minutes allows constant tracking of vessels in important regions like the Taiwan Strait, thereby enhancing the PLA’s targeting capabilities without the political or legal consequences of deploying explicit military assets.

This deliberate blending of civilian and military uses serves multiple strategic purposes. First, it blurs the lines of accountability, making it difficult for adversaries to determine whether satellite behaviour is harmless or strategically aggressive. Second, it complicates the legal and moral foundations for preemptive or defensive action against such satellites. Third, it enables China to function below the threshold of open conflict whilst securing tactical advantages on multiple levels. Essentially, the ambiguity created by civil-military fusion redefines space as a domain for strategic coercion, where the blurring of intent and responsibility is strategic, allowing for operations that fall outside the scope of legal accountability.

The Strategic Role of RPOs

One of the most concerning developments in China’s LEO strategy is its applications of RPOs—manoeuvres that allow satellites to shadow other spacecraft. Yes, RPOs are not inherently aggressive and have legitimate uses in servicing, debris mitigation, and other harmless practices; however, their use in unexplained contexts raises major questions about their motivations and intent. For example, Chinese satellites like the SJ-6 and SJ-17 have often conducted RPOs framed as scientific exploration, often approaching foreign satellites without any prior notification.

Through deterrence theory, particularly drawing from Thomas Schelling’s perspectives, ambiguity can allow for stability only if paired with clear signals and credible retaliatory threats. In China’s case, the lack of stated policy on space conflict, in combination with non-transparent behaviour, undermines this argument. Hence it can be seen that this is not deterrence but coercion: the use of uncertainty to gain advantage without triggering a traditional military response. RPOs thus function as tools, allowing China to scout vulnerabilities, gather intelligence, and potentially interfere with or disrupt enemy infrastructure—all without breaching the boundary into the domain of physical warfare.

These capabilities aren’t standalone; China has also developed a multitude of kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that are meant to act as a safeguard, hence further reinforcing its RPO strategy. Take, for example, the 2007 SC-19 ASAT test, which demonstrated China has both the means and willingness to destroy satellites in orbit. Since then, Beijing has invested in co-orbital systems like SJ-17, which could potentially disable targets without detection. These are supported by electronic warfare tools, like jamming, spoofing, and cyber operations, all of which can target both satellites and their ground control bases. Put together, these developments showcase a deliberate move away from space as a domain of deterrence and towards one of escalation and coercive signalling.

StarNet and the Infrastructure of Orbital Dominance

While a lot of attention has been paid to SpaceX’s Starlink network, China’s parallel development of its own mega-constellation, StarNet (also known as Guowang), should not be overlooked. StarNet’s projected deployment of over 12,000 satellites isn’t simply about increasing internet access; in actuality, it’s designed as a dual-use system, providing ISR, secure communication, and command, control, and communication (C3) infrastructure for PLA operations across the world.

Unlike Starlink, which was developed from commercial sectors and later changed for defence purposes, StarNet is state-owned and strategically integrated from the start. By controlling a dense network of satellites across several layers of orbit, China can achieve situational awareness across continents, robust communication networks with built-in redundancy, and high-speed C3, all of which can prove to be a critical advantage in modern warfare. Therefore, StarNet’s ability to become the orbital backbone of China’s data-led military strategies should not be underestimated. 

Moreover, StarNet exemplifies a broader strategy of combining military assets within commercial technologies, a shift that complicates target identification for potential enemies. Attacks on such systems could be portrayed as strikes on civilian infrastructure, raising the political and legal consequences for any retaliatory military action. This form of “shielding” mirrors strategies seen in other forms of hybrid conflict, where civilian assets are used as cover for military operations. The net result is a space environment in which transparency is eroded, ambiguity is weaponized, and deterrence is structurally undermined.

Strategic Instability and the Failure of Global Governance

One of the main reasons China has been able to carry out this intentionally vague space strategy with limited accountability is due to the flaws of current international space governance. The Outer Space Treaty (OST), signed in 1967, inhibits weapons of mass destruction in orbit but doesn’t address dual-use technologies and operations that now dominate modern space activity. There are no legally binding rules regarding RPOs, any enforcement mechanisms for dual-use technology declarations, and lastly, still no clear definition of hostile intent in space.

The OST relies heavily on principles of good faith and mutual transparency—principles that are misaligned with the realities of competitive spacepower. As China’s behaviour demonstrates, strategic ambiguity exploits precisely these gaps in international space declarations. For instance, the SJ-6 satellites may appear non-threatening when judged by outdated treaty language, but their behaviour—when viewed through a strategic perspective—suggests a far more hard power-driven purpose.

There have been efforts to restructure the OST; however, they have so far produced limited results. The United States has advocated adopting new norms through initiatives such as the Artemis Accords and DARPA’s CONFERS (Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations), which aims to establish soft-law mechanisms for RPO conduct. However, these frameworks have been rejected by both China and Russia, who view these non-binding guidelines as extensions of a Western legal hegemony. As a substitute, Beijing has proposed alternative norms through UN forums that emphasize state sovereignty and “non-interference,” effectively shielding its own covert operations from criticism. The result is a loosely structured legal framework where parallel polities compete for legitimacy, and the shared standards of behaviour continue to erode.

Constraining Strategic Ambiguity in the Orbital Domain

Due to these problems, reforms are urgently needed to rebuild a framework of transparency and accountability in LEO. First, there should be binding intergovernmental agreements codifying mandatory disclosure of RPO activities, including manoeuvre paths, payload specifications, and declared intentions when satellites approach within 10 kilometres of another object. These disclosures can be enforced through a system like the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders in aviation that allow real-time verification of another satellite’s identity and purpose.

Second, efforts must be made to distinguish truly commercial satellites from those operating under government or military control. In order to accomplish this, a verification system—modelled after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—could conduct independent audits of space systems, particularly those operating in dual-use capacities. This would help ensure transparency without requiring states to reveal sensitive technologies.

Finally, achieving space-based strategic stability demands robust technological infrastructures. Investments in decentralized, autonomous satellite constellations can protect national space systems from potential attacks. Micro-satellite constellations engineered with built-in redundancy and fault-tolerant behavior would make it harder for any adversary to neutralize key systems with a single strike, thereby restoring a degree of deterrence. Indeed, such systems are very similar to SpaceX’s Starlink or China’s StarNet; they have already demonstrated the strength of decentralized systems, and their wider adoption across multiple international actors could help normalize this model of defence. If decentralized, autonomous constellations become a common feature of global space infrastructure, they may no longer be perceived as destabilizing but instead as a widely adopted benchmark for  responsible deterrence in space

Conclusion 

China’s militarization of LEO marks a paradigm shift in the dynamics of space-based military capability. No longer a domain governed by transparency and deterrence, LEO is increasingly defined by secrecy, ambiguity, and coercive behaviour. Through a deliberate fusion of civilian and military programs and by exploiting regulatory gaps, China has constructed a space deterrence model that prioritizes operational flexibility at the expense of strategic stability and escalation control. As global governance mechanisms are unable to adapt, the danger is that other spacefaring nations will follow a similar strategy, triggering a downward spiral in space governance that rewards actors who act with aggression and coercion rather than transparency and restraint.

Preventing this requires rethinking the foundations of space law and regulation. Without enforceable norms or flexible governance structures, LEO risks becoming a site of geopolitical contest not through weaponization rather through the manipulation of intentions. In an environment such as this, strategic ambiguity no longer acts like a shield—rather, it becomes the central stage through which future conflicts unfold.

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